Same Regime, Different Face: The West's Recurring Mistake In Iran

The United States should not fall for the wish that any official of the current Iranian regime will somehow be different from the others. This illusion has surfaced repeatedly, repackaged with new faces and new rhetoric, but always serving the same underlying system. Washington and its allies really need to recognize that individuals within the Islamic Republic of Iran do not operate independently of the regime's ideological core -- they are products of it.

For decades, the Iranian regime has played a calculated game. Every few years, when pressure intensifies -- whether economic, political or military -- it introduces a figure portrayed as "moderate" or "pragmatic." This narrative was once built around figures like Presidents Mohammad Khatami and Hassan Rouhani, both marketed to the West as agents of change.

Today, a similar narrative is emerging around Parliamentary Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf. A closer examination of Ghalibaf's record, however, exposes the disaster in this recurring assumption. He is not an outsider, reformer or transformative figure. He is a quintessential insider -- a product of the system from its earliest days. Ghalibaf joined the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) during the Iran-Iraq War and rose through its ranks, later serving as commander of the IRGC Air Force, head of Iran's national police, mayor of Tehran, and ultimately speaker of parliament.

His role in internal repression is uncomfortably telling. During student protests in 1999, Ghalibaf co-signed a letter warning then President Khatami that the IRGC would intervene directly if the unrest was not crushed. He oversaw policing structures and ordered the use of force against demonstrators. These are not the actions of a reformer -- they are the actions of an enforcer.

Ghalibaf's ideological alignment is equally clear. He has consistently praised figures such as the late IRGC Quds Force commander Qasem Soleimani and has emphasized the continuation of Soleimani's legacy, framing it as a guiding model for Iran's regional strategy. Ghalibaf's rhetoric and positions firmly situate him within the regime's hardline worldview, not outside it.

As speaker of parliament, Ghalibaf has also led chants of "Death to America" and "Death to Israel" within the legislative chamber, reinforcing the regime's ideological hostility at the highest levels of governance. This is not symbolic or incidental -- it reflects the core worldview that defines the political system he represents.

His own words further underscore this reality. On November 2, 2022, Ghalibaf explicitly declared:

"Relying upon the assistance of the almighty God, all conspiracies waged by the U.S. government have totally been foiled by the vigilant nation of Islamic Iran."

This statement is not the language of a reformer or a pragmatist -- it is the language of a committed ideological actor framing the United States as a perpetual enemy. Ghalibaf -- like President Ahmed al-Sharaa in Syria, where minorities are being slaughtered in ongoing massacres -- is most likely attempting to humor the US until President Donald Trump is no longer in office and someone less watchful takes his place.

The key point is that no one rises to the upper echelons of the Islamic Republic of Iran without undergoing deep ideological vetting. This system is not a conventional political structure where outsiders can get in to reform it. It is a tightly controlled ideological order dominated by the Supreme Leader and reinforced by institutions such as the IRGC. Loyalty to the regime is not optional -- it is foundational.

What the Trump Administration seems to find irresistible about Ghalibaf is that he is reported to be a "yes man." The Administration is likely hoping that he will be its "yes man," not the IRGC's. The sticking point that has surfaced, however, is that "[e]ven if he wants to do something, he has to get approval from the IRGC and the supreme leadership."

Even when figures such as Ghalibaf are floated as potential candidates for Iran's presidency, they remain deeply embedded in a system where ultimate authority lies in layers of leadership. Whoever thinks that such individuals can independently reshape policy or fundamentally alter the regime's trajectory misunderstands how power operates in Tehran.

The pattern of introducing a supposedly "pragmatic" figure during moments of pressure is simply one way the regime seeks to buy time, ease external pressure, and divide international consensus. The goal is not cooperatively to transform the system, but to help it survive.

At its core, the Islamic Republic of Iran is held together by a revolutionary, fundamentalist ideology. Those within it are not merely participants; they are believers and beneficiaries. For Iran's rulers, reform is not just undesirable -- it is unacceptable, the equivalent of expecting a rabbi to eat bacon on the Jewish fasting day of Yom Kippur.

That is why the expectation of change from within is fundamentally misguided. The individuals are not the drivers of the system; they are its instruments. The structure itself -- its ideology, its power networks, and its security institutions -- dictates outcomes. Without structural change, personnel changes are irrelevant.

Iranian leadership has also demonstrated a long-term policy of strategic patience: an unwavering ability to think in long time horizons, particularly when dealing with the United States. The main objective is to outlast American administrations it perceives as unfavorable. At present, there is a strong incentive for Iran to simply wait out Trump. Future US presidents, it is assumed, will be more accommodating; they always have been.

The United States and its allies, including Israel, should not again fall for the dusted-off illusion that a new Iranian official will now, suddenly, out of a top hat, represent meaningful change. This narrative has been presented before, repeatedly, and each time it has proven misleading. Whether it was Khatami, Rouhani, or now Ghalibaf, in reality, within Iran's regime, there are no true moderates. As long as the current structure of the Islamic Republic remains intact, the system -- not the individuals -- is the defining force.

Originally published at Gatestone Institute